The Battle of El Alamein

The Battle of El Alamein, fought in the deserts of North Africa, is seen as one of the decisive victories of World War Two. The Battle of El Alamein was primarily fought between two of the outstanding commanders of World War Two, Montgomery, who succeeded the dismissed Auchinleck, and Rommel. The Allied victory at El Alamein lead to the retreat of the Afrika Korps and the German surrender in North Africa in May 1943.

Rommel studying maps during the battle at El Alamein

El Alamein is 150 miles west of Cairo. By the summer of 1942, the Allies were in trouble throughout Europe. The attack on Russia - Operation Barbarossa - had pushed the Russians back; U-boats were having a major effect on Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic and western Europe seemed to be fully in the control of the Germans.
Hence the war in the desert of North Africa was pivotal. If the Afrika Korps got to the Suez Canal, the ability of the Allies to supply themselves would be severely dented. The only alternate supply route would be via South Africa - which was not only longer but a lot more dangerous due to the vagaries of the weather. The psychological blow of losing the Suez and losing in North Africa would have been incalculable - especially as this would have given Germany near enough free access to the oil in the Middle East.
El Alamein was a last stand for the Allies in North Africa. To the north of this apparently unremarkable town was the Mediterranean Sea and to the south was the Qattara Depression. El Alamein was a bottleneck that ensures that Rommel could not use his favoured form of attack - sweeping into the enemy from the rear. Rommel was a well respected general in the ranks of the Allies. The Allied commander at the time, Claude Auchinleck - did not command the same respect among his own men. Auchinleck had to send a memo to all his senior officers that ordered them to do all in their power to correct this:

"…(you must) dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents anything other than the ordinary German general……….PS, I’m not jealous of Rommel."  Auchinleck

In August 1942, Winston Churchill was desperate for a victory as he believed that morale was being sapped in Britain. Churchill, despite his status, faced the prospect of a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons if there was no forthcoming victory anywhere. Churchill grasped the bull by the horns./ he dismissed Auchinleck and replaced him with Bernard Montgomery. The men in the Allied forces respected ‘Monty’. He was described as "as quick as a ferret and about as likeable." Montgomery put a great deal of emphasis on organisation and morale. He spoke to his troops and attempted to restore confidence in them. But above all else, he knew that he needed to hold El Alamein anyway possible.
Rommel planned to hit the Allies in the south. Montgomery guessed that this would be the move of Rommel as Rommel had done it before. However, he was also helped by the people who worked at Bletchley Park who had got hold of Rommel’s battle plan and had deciphered it. Therefore ‘Monty’ knew not only Rommel’s plan but also the route of his supply lines. By August 1942, only 33% of what Rommel needed was getting through to him. Rommel was also acutely aware that while he was being starved of supplies, the Allies were getting vast amounts through as they still controlled the Suez and were predominant in the Mediterranean. To resolve what could only become a more difficult situation, Rommel decided to attack quickly even if he was not well-equipped.
By the end of August 1942, Montgomery was ready himself. He knew that Rommel was very short of fuel and that the Germans could not sustain a long campaign. When Rommel attacked, Montgomery was asleep. When he was woken from his sleep to be told the news, it is said that he replied "excellent, excellent" and went back to sleep again.
The Allies had placed a huge number of land mines south of El Alamein at Alam Halfa. German Panzer tanks were severely hit by these and the rest were held up and became sitting targets for Allied fighter planes that could easily pick off tank after tank. Rommel’s attack started badly and it seemed as if his Afrika Korps would be wiped out. He ordered his tanks north and he was then helped by nature. A sandstorm blew up which gave his tanks much needed cover from marauding British fighters. However, once the sandstorm cleared, Rommel’s force was hit by Allied bombers that pounded the area where the Afrika Corps had their tanks. Rommel had no choice but to retreat. He fully expected Montgomery’s Eighth Army to follow him as this was standard military procedure. However, ‘Monty’ failed to do this. He was not ready for an offensive and he ordered his men to stay put while they held a decisive defensive line.
In fact, Montgomery was waiting for the arrival of something that soldiers in the desert were only allowed to refer to as ‘swallows’. In fact, they were Sherman tanks - 300 of them to assist the Allies. Their 75 mm gun shot a 6lb shell that could penetrate a Panzer at 2000 metres. The 300 ‘Monty’ had were invaluable.
To cope with Montgomery’s attack, the Germans had 110,000 men and 500 tanks. A number of these tanks were poor Italian tanks and could not match the new Sherman’s. The Germans were also short of fuel. The Allies had more than 200,000 men and more than 1000 tanks. They were also armed with a six-pound artillery gun which was highly effective up to 1500 metres. Between the two armies was the ‘Devil’s Garden’. This was a mine field laid by the Germans which was 5 miles wide and littered with a huge number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Going through such a defence would prove to be a nightmare for the Allies.
To throw Rommel off the scent, Montgomery launched ‘Operation Bertram’. This plan was to convince Rommel that the full-might of the Eighth Army would be used in the south. Dummy tanks were erected in the region. A dummy pipeline was also built - slowly, so as to convince Rommel that the Allies were in no hurry to attack the Afrika Korps. ‘Monty’s army in the north also had to ‘disappear’. Tanks were covered so as to appear as non-threatening lorries. Bertram worked as Rommel became convinced that the attack would be in the south.
At the start of the real attack, Montgomery sent a message to all the men in the Eighth Army:

"Everyone must be imbued with the desire kill Germans, even the padres - one for weekdays and two on Sundays."

The start of the Allied attack on Rommel was code-named "Operation Lightfoot". There was a reason for this. A diversionary attack in the south was meant to take in 50% of Rommel’s forces. The main attack in the north was to last - according to Montgomery - just one night. The infantry had to attack first. Many of the anti-tank mines would not be tripped by soldiers running over them - they were too light (hence the code-name). As the infantry attacked, engineers had to clear a path for the tanks coming up in the rear. Each stretch of land cleared of mines was to be 24 feet - just enough to get a tank through in single file. The engineers had to clear a five mile section through the ‘Devil’s Garden’. It was an awesome task and one that essentially failed. ‘Monty’ had a simple message for his troops on the eve of the battle:

"All that is necessary is that each and every officer and men should enter this battle with the determination to see it through, to fight and kill, and finally to win. If we do this, there can be only one result - together, we will hit the enemy for six out of Africa."

The attack on Rommel’s lines started with over 800 artillery guns firing at the German lines. Legend has it that the noise was so great that the ears of the gunners bled. As the shells pounded the German lines, the infantry attacked. The engineers set about clearing mines. Their task was very dangerous as one mine was inter-connected with others via wires and if one mines was set off, many others could be. The stretch of cleared land for the tanks proved to be Montgomery’s Achilles heel. Just one non-moving tank could hold up all the tanks that were behind it. The ensuing traffic jams made the tanks easy targets for the German gunners using the feared 88 artillery gun. The plan to get the tanks through in one night failed. The infantry had also not got as far as Montgomery had planned. They had to dig in.
The second night of the attack was also unsuccessful. ‘Monty’ blamed his chief of tanks, Lumsden. He was given a simple ultimatum - move forward - or be replaced by someone more energetic. But the rate of attrition of the Allied forces was taking its toll. Operation Lightfoot was called off and Montgomery, not Lumsden, withdrew his tanks. When he received the news, Churchill was furious as he believed that Montgomery was letting victory go.
However, Rommel and the Afrika Korps had also been suffering. He only had 300 tanks left to the Allies 900+. ‘Monty’ next planned to make a move to the Mediterranean. Australian units attacked the Germans by the Mediterranean and Rommel had to move his tanks north to cover this. The Australians took many casualties but their attack was to change the course of the battle.
Rommel became convinced that the main thrust of Montgomery’s attack would be near the Mediterranean and he moved a large amount of his Afrika Korps there. The Australians fought with ferocity - even Rommel commented on the "rivers of blood" in the region. However, the Australians had given Montgomery room to manoeuvre.
He launched ‘Operation Supercharge’. This was a British and New Zealander infantry attack made south of where the Australians were fighting. Rommel was taken by surprise. 123 tanks of the 9th Armoured Brigade attacked the German lines. But a sandstorm once again saved Rommel. Many of the tanks got lost and they were easy for the German 88 gunners to pick off. 75% of the 9th Brigade was lost. But the overwhelming number of Allied tanks meant that more arrived to help out and it was these tanks that tipped the balance. Rommel put tank against tank - but his men were hopelessly outnumbered.
By November 2nd 1942, Rommel knew that he was beaten. Hitler ordered the Afrika Korps to fight to the last but Rommel refused to carry out this order. On November 4th, Rommel started his retreat. 25,000 Germans and Italians had been killed or wounded in the battle and 13,000 Allied troops in the Eighth Army.

Adopted from : http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_el_alamein.htm

1943: The Heroes of Telemark

The Allied forces high command in London determined that the Germans must be stopped from developing an atomic reactor and nuclear bomb at any cost.

Water was dripping in a hydrogen plant at Rjukan in Telemark, Southern Norway, as it had done since1934. But this was no ordinary water, and no ordinary plant - it was the only facility in Europe that produced heavy water in large-scale volumes.

The Germans kept the plant under heavy guard during World War II - for good reason. The barrels of heavy water that were rolled out were sent to Germany, where they were used to control nuclear fission.

Following the occupation of Norway in the spring of 1940, it soon became clear that the Germans were interested in heavy water. By the start of 1942, production at new installations in Rjukan, based on a German method, increased to 100 kilos per month. Not long after, the Germans announced they wanted to increase output further.

The situation escalated to the point that Hydro's top management protested and the company's managing director Bjarne Eriksen was arrested in early 1943 and sent to a concentration camp in Germany.

A secret weapon?

It was known in London and Washington that two German atomic physicists were working on nuclear fission, and it was assumed that heavy water had something to do with Hitler's threat of a secret weapon.

Norwegians in London assisted in the plans to sabotage the heavy water unit at the Vemork power plant at Rjukan, and photographs and sketches of the plant were sent to London by Norwegian contacts at the facility, in particular Jomar Brun, manager of the heavy water unit.

A huge political thriller began to unfold in 1943 and 1944. Was this a question of preventing the development of a nuclear weapon? Was this an arms race? In any case, the outcome could determine who won the war.

The first attempt to attack the Vemork plant ended in tragedy. Two planes from the 1st Airborne Division crashed in fog in Southern Norway, and all aboard were either killed in the crash or shot by the Germans. A sabotage operation was then planned. This was to be carried out by specially trained Norwegians.

Heroic action

In 1990, the heavy water saboteurs met up again at Rjukan and followed the same route from the mountains to the Vemork plant.

A total of 12 hand-picked men were dropped by parachute onto the Hardangervidda mountain plateau, a good distance to the west of Rjukan and the Vemork plants. They stayed on the plateau, some 1,200 metres above sea level, throughout several winter months, eating the meat and stomach contents of wild reindeer.

The Vemork action is considered one of the most heroic sabotage acts of World War II. It was daring and spectacular in every way. Those who assigned the task were not at all sure that the men who carried it out would survive.

To reach the Vemork plant, the group of saboteurs had to cross the river right at the bottom of the gorge, as they could not use the suspension bridge. Joachim Rønneberg, the group leader, explains that all they had to go on was an aerial photo, taken at a height of 4,000 metres, that suggested that this was viable.

It was only after Claus Helberg had been out on a couple reconnaissance missions in the area that the group decided that the seemingly impossible task of climbing across the gorge could be attempted.

Through a minefield

One hour before midnight on February 27, the 12 saboteurs climbed down the gorge and across the ice-choked river, edged up the rock face on the other side, and emerged by the railway track to the hydrogen plant. The cover team now had to scramble up and cut through the gate or the railings.

Knut Haukelid and Arne Kjelstrup found the path alongside the railway line, but felt reasonably sure that mines had been laid to protect the facility from intruders. They cut the iron chain that blocked the way. Jens Anton Poulsson, who was the coordinating link with the men behind signalled the main group to proceed. They were soon all at the gate. And just minutes later, everyone was in position.

No lives lost

Entering the plant was just as challenging. Rønneberg, who led the explosives team, relates that the group first tried to get in through a basement door, without success. The brief from London had told them to climb a stairway to a hole in the wall for the cable, and to follow the cable tunnel running below the ceiling of the ground floor of the plant.

Rønneberg and Hans Storhaug made it in this way and took the guard by surprise. Birger Strømshaug, Fredrik Kayser and Kaspar Idland broke a window to get in, but the German guards heard nothing above the powerful drone of the generators.

"Two of us mounted the explosive charges. The fuses were about two minutes long. I cut them down to 30 seconds and lit them," says Rønneberg.

"How did you get out so fast?"

"I had a key. We knew that our cover squad was in position. The German guards had been put out of action, locked up in the guardhouse," he explains.

The charges blew, the sound of shattering glass again split the air, but the German guards can hardly have grasped that it was an explosion. A guard sauntered out, tried the door to the electrolyser facility, found it locked, and went back inside the guardhouse. A short time later, he came out again with a torch and shined it along the ground. The Germans must have thought the snow had triggered one of the mines to explode. The guard gave up and went back into the guardhouse again - and probably saved his life.

Full-scale search

By the time the Germans had realized what had happened and soldiers started streaming up to the Vemork plant, the saboteurs were already far down the railway line on their way to Rjukan. It was very dark and the snow was deep but they all got away.

Once back on the mountain plateau, the group split up. The explosives team travelled by ski, fully armed and in uniform, over the high country and across the valleys of Eastern Norway to Sweden. The others spread out over the plateau. The Germans brought in thousands of soldiers and organized an extensive search, but were unable to find any of the saboteurs.

The successful action destroyed the facility and large quantities of heavy water. 

The Rjukan plants were heavily bombed in the autumn of 1943. The damage was extensive.

Many killed in bomb raid

The heavy water plant was rebuilt and production restarted during the next six months. On the night of 16 November 1943, 140 US bombers swooped in over Rjukan and totally destroyed the Vemork power station and electrolyser plant. Many people were killed. After that, the Germans gave up producing heavy water at Vemork.

"Hydro" sinks to bottom of the Tinnsjø lake

A couple of months later, the saboteurs discovered that the Germans planned to ship all the semi-finished products from Vemork to research centres in Germany. Orders came by radio from London to destroy the cargo during transport. The weakest link was the journey by train ferry over the Tinnsjø lake. An explosion in the bow sank the "Hydro" on 20 February 1944, and ended the last chapter in the story of heavy water in Norway. The sinking of the "Hydro" cost four Germans and 14 Norwegians their lives.

The heavy water cargo was closely guarded at all times, but the boat that was to transport the shipment stood unwatched the night before. One of the three saboteurs had experimented with a timer and detonating mechanism, and he tried to set the explosion to go off when it would be easiest to rescue passengers.

The ferry's departure was unfortunately delayed. However, far more lives would have been lost if the explosion had been set off on a weekday. There was never many passengers on Sundays.

Fifty years later, to the day, on Sunday 20 February 1994, the county governor of Telemark unveiled a memorial in honour of the victims, close to the place the "Hydro" sank. 

"Not so heroic"

Later the saboteurs played down the significance of their own role in the action.

"We were sent back to Norway from England as the King's men. We were armed and could hide in the mountains if we were discovered. It was worse for the people in Rjukan who helped us. They had families and homes and farms to take care of. They and their families had to live in fear of what could happen if they were found out," commented Knut Haukelid, who returned to Rjukan many years later for a reunion with the men who carried out the Vemork action.

Adopted from : http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-history/1929---1945/1943-The-Heroes-of-Telemark/