The Battle of El Alamein

The Battle of El Alamein, fought in the deserts of North Africa, is seen as one of the decisive victories of World War Two. The Battle of El Alamein was primarily fought between two of the outstanding commanders of World War Two, Montgomery, who succeeded the dismissed Auchinleck, and Rommel. The Allied victory at El Alamein lead to the retreat of the Afrika Korps and the German surrender in North Africa in May 1943.

Rommel studying maps during the battle at El Alamein

El Alamein is 150 miles west of Cairo. By the summer of 1942, the Allies were in trouble throughout Europe. The attack on Russia - Operation Barbarossa - had pushed the Russians back; U-boats were having a major effect on Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic and western Europe seemed to be fully in the control of the Germans.
Hence the war in the desert of North Africa was pivotal. If the Afrika Korps got to the Suez Canal, the ability of the Allies to supply themselves would be severely dented. The only alternate supply route would be via South Africa - which was not only longer but a lot more dangerous due to the vagaries of the weather. The psychological blow of losing the Suez and losing in North Africa would have been incalculable - especially as this would have given Germany near enough free access to the oil in the Middle East.
El Alamein was a last stand for the Allies in North Africa. To the north of this apparently unremarkable town was the Mediterranean Sea and to the south was the Qattara Depression. El Alamein was a bottleneck that ensures that Rommel could not use his favoured form of attack - sweeping into the enemy from the rear. Rommel was a well respected general in the ranks of the Allies. The Allied commander at the time, Claude Auchinleck - did not command the same respect among his own men. Auchinleck had to send a memo to all his senior officers that ordered them to do all in their power to correct this:

"…(you must) dispel by all possible means the idea that Rommel represents anything other than the ordinary German general……….PS, I’m not jealous of Rommel."  Auchinleck

In August 1942, Winston Churchill was desperate for a victory as he believed that morale was being sapped in Britain. Churchill, despite his status, faced the prospect of a vote of no confidence in the House of Commons if there was no forthcoming victory anywhere. Churchill grasped the bull by the horns./ he dismissed Auchinleck and replaced him with Bernard Montgomery. The men in the Allied forces respected ‘Monty’. He was described as "as quick as a ferret and about as likeable." Montgomery put a great deal of emphasis on organisation and morale. He spoke to his troops and attempted to restore confidence in them. But above all else, he knew that he needed to hold El Alamein anyway possible.
Rommel planned to hit the Allies in the south. Montgomery guessed that this would be the move of Rommel as Rommel had done it before. However, he was also helped by the people who worked at Bletchley Park who had got hold of Rommel’s battle plan and had deciphered it. Therefore ‘Monty’ knew not only Rommel’s plan but also the route of his supply lines. By August 1942, only 33% of what Rommel needed was getting through to him. Rommel was also acutely aware that while he was being starved of supplies, the Allies were getting vast amounts through as they still controlled the Suez and were predominant in the Mediterranean. To resolve what could only become a more difficult situation, Rommel decided to attack quickly even if he was not well-equipped.
By the end of August 1942, Montgomery was ready himself. He knew that Rommel was very short of fuel and that the Germans could not sustain a long campaign. When Rommel attacked, Montgomery was asleep. When he was woken from his sleep to be told the news, it is said that he replied "excellent, excellent" and went back to sleep again.
The Allies had placed a huge number of land mines south of El Alamein at Alam Halfa. German Panzer tanks were severely hit by these and the rest were held up and became sitting targets for Allied fighter planes that could easily pick off tank after tank. Rommel’s attack started badly and it seemed as if his Afrika Korps would be wiped out. He ordered his tanks north and he was then helped by nature. A sandstorm blew up which gave his tanks much needed cover from marauding British fighters. However, once the sandstorm cleared, Rommel’s force was hit by Allied bombers that pounded the area where the Afrika Corps had their tanks. Rommel had no choice but to retreat. He fully expected Montgomery’s Eighth Army to follow him as this was standard military procedure. However, ‘Monty’ failed to do this. He was not ready for an offensive and he ordered his men to stay put while they held a decisive defensive line.
In fact, Montgomery was waiting for the arrival of something that soldiers in the desert were only allowed to refer to as ‘swallows’. In fact, they were Sherman tanks - 300 of them to assist the Allies. Their 75 mm gun shot a 6lb shell that could penetrate a Panzer at 2000 metres. The 300 ‘Monty’ had were invaluable.
To cope with Montgomery’s attack, the Germans had 110,000 men and 500 tanks. A number of these tanks were poor Italian tanks and could not match the new Sherman’s. The Germans were also short of fuel. The Allies had more than 200,000 men and more than 1000 tanks. They were also armed with a six-pound artillery gun which was highly effective up to 1500 metres. Between the two armies was the ‘Devil’s Garden’. This was a mine field laid by the Germans which was 5 miles wide and littered with a huge number of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. Going through such a defence would prove to be a nightmare for the Allies.
To throw Rommel off the scent, Montgomery launched ‘Operation Bertram’. This plan was to convince Rommel that the full-might of the Eighth Army would be used in the south. Dummy tanks were erected in the region. A dummy pipeline was also built - slowly, so as to convince Rommel that the Allies were in no hurry to attack the Afrika Korps. ‘Monty’s army in the north also had to ‘disappear’. Tanks were covered so as to appear as non-threatening lorries. Bertram worked as Rommel became convinced that the attack would be in the south.
At the start of the real attack, Montgomery sent a message to all the men in the Eighth Army:

"Everyone must be imbued with the desire kill Germans, even the padres - one for weekdays and two on Sundays."

The start of the Allied attack on Rommel was code-named "Operation Lightfoot". There was a reason for this. A diversionary attack in the south was meant to take in 50% of Rommel’s forces. The main attack in the north was to last - according to Montgomery - just one night. The infantry had to attack first. Many of the anti-tank mines would not be tripped by soldiers running over them - they were too light (hence the code-name). As the infantry attacked, engineers had to clear a path for the tanks coming up in the rear. Each stretch of land cleared of mines was to be 24 feet - just enough to get a tank through in single file. The engineers had to clear a five mile section through the ‘Devil’s Garden’. It was an awesome task and one that essentially failed. ‘Monty’ had a simple message for his troops on the eve of the battle:

"All that is necessary is that each and every officer and men should enter this battle with the determination to see it through, to fight and kill, and finally to win. If we do this, there can be only one result - together, we will hit the enemy for six out of Africa."

The attack on Rommel’s lines started with over 800 artillery guns firing at the German lines. Legend has it that the noise was so great that the ears of the gunners bled. As the shells pounded the German lines, the infantry attacked. The engineers set about clearing mines. Their task was very dangerous as one mine was inter-connected with others via wires and if one mines was set off, many others could be. The stretch of cleared land for the tanks proved to be Montgomery’s Achilles heel. Just one non-moving tank could hold up all the tanks that were behind it. The ensuing traffic jams made the tanks easy targets for the German gunners using the feared 88 artillery gun. The plan to get the tanks through in one night failed. The infantry had also not got as far as Montgomery had planned. They had to dig in.
The second night of the attack was also unsuccessful. ‘Monty’ blamed his chief of tanks, Lumsden. He was given a simple ultimatum - move forward - or be replaced by someone more energetic. But the rate of attrition of the Allied forces was taking its toll. Operation Lightfoot was called off and Montgomery, not Lumsden, withdrew his tanks. When he received the news, Churchill was furious as he believed that Montgomery was letting victory go.
However, Rommel and the Afrika Korps had also been suffering. He only had 300 tanks left to the Allies 900+. ‘Monty’ next planned to make a move to the Mediterranean. Australian units attacked the Germans by the Mediterranean and Rommel had to move his tanks north to cover this. The Australians took many casualties but their attack was to change the course of the battle.
Rommel became convinced that the main thrust of Montgomery’s attack would be near the Mediterranean and he moved a large amount of his Afrika Korps there. The Australians fought with ferocity - even Rommel commented on the "rivers of blood" in the region. However, the Australians had given Montgomery room to manoeuvre.
He launched ‘Operation Supercharge’. This was a British and New Zealander infantry attack made south of where the Australians were fighting. Rommel was taken by surprise. 123 tanks of the 9th Armoured Brigade attacked the German lines. But a sandstorm once again saved Rommel. Many of the tanks got lost and they were easy for the German 88 gunners to pick off. 75% of the 9th Brigade was lost. But the overwhelming number of Allied tanks meant that more arrived to help out and it was these tanks that tipped the balance. Rommel put tank against tank - but his men were hopelessly outnumbered.
By November 2nd 1942, Rommel knew that he was beaten. Hitler ordered the Afrika Korps to fight to the last but Rommel refused to carry out this order. On November 4th, Rommel started his retreat. 25,000 Germans and Italians had been killed or wounded in the battle and 13,000 Allied troops in the Eighth Army.

Adopted from : http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_el_alamein.htm

1943: The Heroes of Telemark

The Allied forces high command in London determined that the Germans must be stopped from developing an atomic reactor and nuclear bomb at any cost.

Water was dripping in a hydrogen plant at Rjukan in Telemark, Southern Norway, as it had done since1934. But this was no ordinary water, and no ordinary plant - it was the only facility in Europe that produced heavy water in large-scale volumes.

The Germans kept the plant under heavy guard during World War II - for good reason. The barrels of heavy water that were rolled out were sent to Germany, where they were used to control nuclear fission.

Following the occupation of Norway in the spring of 1940, it soon became clear that the Germans were interested in heavy water. By the start of 1942, production at new installations in Rjukan, based on a German method, increased to 100 kilos per month. Not long after, the Germans announced they wanted to increase output further.

The situation escalated to the point that Hydro's top management protested and the company's managing director Bjarne Eriksen was arrested in early 1943 and sent to a concentration camp in Germany.

A secret weapon?

It was known in London and Washington that two German atomic physicists were working on nuclear fission, and it was assumed that heavy water had something to do with Hitler's threat of a secret weapon.

Norwegians in London assisted in the plans to sabotage the heavy water unit at the Vemork power plant at Rjukan, and photographs and sketches of the plant were sent to London by Norwegian contacts at the facility, in particular Jomar Brun, manager of the heavy water unit.

A huge political thriller began to unfold in 1943 and 1944. Was this a question of preventing the development of a nuclear weapon? Was this an arms race? In any case, the outcome could determine who won the war.

The first attempt to attack the Vemork plant ended in tragedy. Two planes from the 1st Airborne Division crashed in fog in Southern Norway, and all aboard were either killed in the crash or shot by the Germans. A sabotage operation was then planned. This was to be carried out by specially trained Norwegians.

Heroic action

In 1990, the heavy water saboteurs met up again at Rjukan and followed the same route from the mountains to the Vemork plant.

A total of 12 hand-picked men were dropped by parachute onto the Hardangervidda mountain plateau, a good distance to the west of Rjukan and the Vemork plants. They stayed on the plateau, some 1,200 metres above sea level, throughout several winter months, eating the meat and stomach contents of wild reindeer.

The Vemork action is considered one of the most heroic sabotage acts of World War II. It was daring and spectacular in every way. Those who assigned the task were not at all sure that the men who carried it out would survive.

To reach the Vemork plant, the group of saboteurs had to cross the river right at the bottom of the gorge, as they could not use the suspension bridge. Joachim Rønneberg, the group leader, explains that all they had to go on was an aerial photo, taken at a height of 4,000 metres, that suggested that this was viable.

It was only after Claus Helberg had been out on a couple reconnaissance missions in the area that the group decided that the seemingly impossible task of climbing across the gorge could be attempted.

Through a minefield

One hour before midnight on February 27, the 12 saboteurs climbed down the gorge and across the ice-choked river, edged up the rock face on the other side, and emerged by the railway track to the hydrogen plant. The cover team now had to scramble up and cut through the gate or the railings.

Knut Haukelid and Arne Kjelstrup found the path alongside the railway line, but felt reasonably sure that mines had been laid to protect the facility from intruders. They cut the iron chain that blocked the way. Jens Anton Poulsson, who was the coordinating link with the men behind signalled the main group to proceed. They were soon all at the gate. And just minutes later, everyone was in position.

No lives lost

Entering the plant was just as challenging. Rønneberg, who led the explosives team, relates that the group first tried to get in through a basement door, without success. The brief from London had told them to climb a stairway to a hole in the wall for the cable, and to follow the cable tunnel running below the ceiling of the ground floor of the plant.

Rønneberg and Hans Storhaug made it in this way and took the guard by surprise. Birger Strømshaug, Fredrik Kayser and Kaspar Idland broke a window to get in, but the German guards heard nothing above the powerful drone of the generators.

"Two of us mounted the explosive charges. The fuses were about two minutes long. I cut them down to 30 seconds and lit them," says Rønneberg.

"How did you get out so fast?"

"I had a key. We knew that our cover squad was in position. The German guards had been put out of action, locked up in the guardhouse," he explains.

The charges blew, the sound of shattering glass again split the air, but the German guards can hardly have grasped that it was an explosion. A guard sauntered out, tried the door to the electrolyser facility, found it locked, and went back inside the guardhouse. A short time later, he came out again with a torch and shined it along the ground. The Germans must have thought the snow had triggered one of the mines to explode. The guard gave up and went back into the guardhouse again - and probably saved his life.

Full-scale search

By the time the Germans had realized what had happened and soldiers started streaming up to the Vemork plant, the saboteurs were already far down the railway line on their way to Rjukan. It was very dark and the snow was deep but they all got away.

Once back on the mountain plateau, the group split up. The explosives team travelled by ski, fully armed and in uniform, over the high country and across the valleys of Eastern Norway to Sweden. The others spread out over the plateau. The Germans brought in thousands of soldiers and organized an extensive search, but were unable to find any of the saboteurs.

The successful action destroyed the facility and large quantities of heavy water. 

The Rjukan plants were heavily bombed in the autumn of 1943. The damage was extensive.

Many killed in bomb raid

The heavy water plant was rebuilt and production restarted during the next six months. On the night of 16 November 1943, 140 US bombers swooped in over Rjukan and totally destroyed the Vemork power station and electrolyser plant. Many people were killed. After that, the Germans gave up producing heavy water at Vemork.

"Hydro" sinks to bottom of the Tinnsjø lake

A couple of months later, the saboteurs discovered that the Germans planned to ship all the semi-finished products from Vemork to research centres in Germany. Orders came by radio from London to destroy the cargo during transport. The weakest link was the journey by train ferry over the Tinnsjø lake. An explosion in the bow sank the "Hydro" on 20 February 1944, and ended the last chapter in the story of heavy water in Norway. The sinking of the "Hydro" cost four Germans and 14 Norwegians their lives.

The heavy water cargo was closely guarded at all times, but the boat that was to transport the shipment stood unwatched the night before. One of the three saboteurs had experimented with a timer and detonating mechanism, and he tried to set the explosion to go off when it would be easiest to rescue passengers.

The ferry's departure was unfortunately delayed. However, far more lives would have been lost if the explosion had been set off on a weekday. There was never many passengers on Sundays.

Fifty years later, to the day, on Sunday 20 February 1994, the county governor of Telemark unveiled a memorial in honour of the victims, close to the place the "Hydro" sank. 

"Not so heroic"

Later the saboteurs played down the significance of their own role in the action.

"We were sent back to Norway from England as the King's men. We were armed and could hide in the mountains if we were discovered. It was worse for the people in Rjukan who helped us. They had families and homes and farms to take care of. They and their families had to live in fear of what could happen if they were found out," commented Knut Haukelid, who returned to Rjukan many years later for a reunion with the men who carried out the Vemork action.

Adopted from : http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Our-history/1929---1945/1943-The-Heroes-of-Telemark/

The Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge, fought over the winter months of 1944 – 1945, was the last major Nazi offensive against the Allies in World War Two. The battle was a last ditch attempt by Hitler to split the Allies in two in their drive towards Germany and destroy their ability to supply themselves.

The Battle of the Bulge started on December 16th 1944. Hitler had convinced himself that the alliance between Britain, France and America in the western sector of Europe was not strong and that a major attack and defeat would break up the alliance. Therefore, he ordered a massive attack against what were primarily American forces. The attack is strictly known as the Ardennes Offensive but because the initial attack by the Germans created a bulge in the Allied front line, it has become more commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge.

Hitler’s plan was to launch a massive attack using three armies on the Allies which would, in his mind, destabilise their accord and also take the huge port of Antwerp through which a great deal of supplies was reaching the Allies.

The plan was:

Ø The Sixth Panzer Army, led by Sepp Dietrich, was to lead the attack and to capture Antwerp

Ø The Fifth Panzer Army, led by Manteuffel, was to attack the centre of the American forces, capture the strategic road and rail centre of St Vith and then drive on to Brussels.

Ø The Seventh Army, led by Brandenberger, was to attack in the southern flank, as designated by Hitler, and to create a buffer zone to prevent American reinforcements from attacking the Fifth Panzer Army.

Ø The Fifteenth Army was to be held in reserve to counter any Allied attack when they took place.

Hitler believed that his forces would be able to surround and cut off Canada’s First Army, America’s First and Ninth Armies and Britain’s Second Army. On paper, it was a seemingly absurd plan – especially as Germany had been in retreat since D-Day, her military was depleted of supplies and was facing the awesome might of the Allies. However, Hitler, as commander-in-chief of the military, decreed that the attack should take place.

The battle started with a two hour bombardment of the Allies lines that was followed by a huge armoured attack with the majority of the German armoured might based at the Schnee Eifel. The Germans experienced great success to start with. Why was this?

Ø The Allies were surprised by the attack. They had received little intelligence that such an attack would take place.

Ø Before the attack started, English speaking German soldiers dressed in American uniforms went behind the lines of the Allies and caused havoc by spreading misinformation, changing road signs and cutting telephone lines. Those who were caught were shot after a court martial.

Ø The weather was also in Hitler’s favour. Low cloud and fog meant that the superior air force of the Allies could not be used – especially the tank-busting Typhoons of the RAF or Mustang fighters from the USAAF which would have been used against the German tanks. Though the weather was typical for the Ardennes in winter, the ground was hard enough for military vehicles to cross and this suited the armoured attack Hitler envisaged.

However, the success of the Germans lasted just two days. Despite punching a bulge into the Allies front line, the Germans could not capitalise on this. The Germans had based their attack on a massive armoured onslaught. However, such an attack required fuel to maintain it and the Germans simply did not possess such quantities of fuel.

By December 22nd, the weather started to clear, thus allowing the Allies to bring their air power into force and on the following day, the Americans started a counter-attack against the Germans.

On Christmas Eve, the Allies experienced the first ever attack by jet bombers. Sixteen German Me-262’s attacked rail yards in an attempt to upset the ability of the Allies to supply themselves. However, without fuel for their armoured vehicles, any success in the air was meaningless.

The Germans had advanced 60 miles in two days but from December 18th on, they were in a position of stalemate. The fighting was ferocious. The New Year’s period was a time of particularly intensive fighting as the Germans attempted to start a second front in Holland. This time in the Ardennes coincided with a period of intense cold and rain and the soldiers on the ground faced very difficult conditions. Trench foot was a common problem for infantrymen, as was exposure.

By mid-January 1945, the effect of lack of fuel was becoming evident as the Germans had to simply abandon their vehicles. The 1st SS Panzer Division, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Joachim Peiper, had to make their way back to Germany on foot. This was the unit that was responsible for the Malmédy Massacre.

The Battle of the Bulge was the largest battle fought by the Americans in World War Two. 600,000 American troops were involved in the battle. The Americans lost 81,000 men while the Germans lost 100,000 killed, wounded and captured.

Could the Germans have won the battle? Almost certainly not, as they had one huge problem – their inability to keep their armoured columns supplied with fuel. Any form of armoured attack needed a constant supply of fuel – and Allied bombing of fuel plants in Germany meant that such supplies did not exist. Field Marshall von Rundstedt believed all along that the plan was too ambitious. When on trial after the war, von Rundstedt said that “all, absolutely all, conditions for the possible success of such an offensive were lacking.” His views were shared by General von Mellenthin:

"The Ardennes battle drives home the lesson that a large-scale offensive by massed armour has no hope of success against an enemy who enjoys supreme command of the air. Our precious reserves had been expended, and nothing was available to ward off the impending catastrophe in the east."

Also, Hitler's plan that a successful attack would split the Allies was also based on false hope. If anything, such an attack helped to engender a greater feeling of kinship with one consolidated aim - to defeat Nazi Germany.

Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Overview and Special Image Selection

On 6 June 1944 the Western Allies landed in northern France, opening the long-awaited "Second Front" against Adolf Hitler's Germany. Though they had been fighting in mainland Italy for some nine months, the Normandy invasion was in a strategically more important region, setting the stage to drive the Germans from France and ultimately destroy the National Socialist regime.

It had been four long years since France had been overrun and the British compelled to leave continental Europe, three since Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union and two and a half since the United States had formally entered the struggle. After an often seemingly hopeless fight, beginning in late 1942 the Germans had been stopped and forced into slow retreat in eastern Europe, defeated in North Africa and confronted in Italy. U.S. and British bombers had visited ruin on the enemy's industrial cities. Allied navies had contained the German submarine threat, making possible an immense buildup of ground, sea and air power in the British Isles.

Schemes for a return to France, long in preparation, were now feasible. Detailed operation plans were in hand. Troops were well-trained, vast numbers of ships accumulated, and local German forces battered from the air. Clever deceptions had confused the enemy about just when, and especially where, the blow would fall.

Commanded by U.S. Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Normandy assault phase, code-named "Neptune" (the entire operation was "Overlord"), was launched when weather reports predicted satisfactory conditions on 6 June. Hundreds of amphibious ships and craft, supported by combatant warships, crossed the English Channel behind dozens of minesweepers. They arrived off the beaches before dawn. Three divisions of paratroopers (two American, one British) had already been dropped inland. Following a brief bombardment by ships' guns, Soldiers of six divisions (three American, two British and one Canadian) stormed ashore in five main landing areas, named "Utah", "Omaha", "Gold", "Juno" and "Sword". After hard fighting, especially on "Omaha" Beach, by day's end a foothold was well established.

As German counterattacks were thwarted, the Allies poured men and materiel into France. By late July these reinforcements, and constant combat, made possible a break out from the Normandy perimeter. Another landing, in southern France in August, facilitated that nation's liberation. With the Soviets advancing from the east, Hitler's armies were shoved, sometimes haltingly and always bloodily, back toward their homeland. The Second World War had entered its climactic phase.

This page features a historical overview and special image selection on the June 1944 invasion of Normandy, chosen from the more comprehensive coverage featured in the following pages, and those linked from them:

• Crossing the English Channel on "D-Day",6 June 1944
  
• D-Day Landings, 6 June 1944
  
• D-Day Landings on "Omaha" Beach
  
• D-Day Landings on "Pointe du Hoc"
  
• D-Day Landings on "Utah" Beach
  

Artworks related to the Normandy operation The Invasion of Normandy

Additional information resources on the Normandy Invasion D-Day, the Normandy Invasion, 6-25 June 1944

Click photograph for a larger image.

Photo #: 80-G-59422 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Army troops on board a LCT, ready to ride across the English Channel to France. Some of these men wear 101st Airborne Division insignia. Photograph released 12 June 1944. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives. Online Image: 186KB; 740 x 605 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 26-G-2333 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 A convoy of Landing Craft Infantry (Large) sails across the English Channel toward the Normandy Invasion beaches on "D-Day", 6 June 1944. Each of these landing craft is towing a barrage balloon for protection against low-flying German aircraft. Among the LCI(L)s present are: LCI(L)-56, at far left; LCI(L)-325; and LCI(L)-4. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 116KB; 740 x 615 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 26-G-2337 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 LCVP landing craft put troops ashore on "Omaha" Beach on "D-Day", 6 June 1944. The LCVP at far left is from USS Samuel Chase (APA-26). Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 132KB; 740 x 630 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 26-G-2343 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Army troops wade ashore on "Omaha" Beach during the "D-Day" landings, 6 June 1944. They were brought to the beach by a Coast Guard manned LCVP. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 86KB; 740 x 610 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: KN-17825 (Color) "The Tough Beach" Watercolor by Navy Combat Artist Dwight Shepler, 1944, showing German artillery fire hitting U.S. forces on "Omaha" Beach, on "D-Day" of the Normandy invasion, 6 June 1944. In the foreground is USS LCI(L)-93, aground and holed. She was lost on this occasion. Courtesy of the U.S. Navy Art Collection, Washington, D.C. Official U.S. Navy Photograph. Online Image: 109KB; 740 x 555 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: SC 189910 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Wounded men of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, receive cigarettes and food after they had stormed "Omaha" beach on "D-Day", 6 June 1944. Photograph from the Army Signal Corps Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 128KB; 740 x 605 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 80-G-252412 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Forward 14"/45 guns of USS Nevada (BB-36) fire on positions ashore, during the landings on "Utah" Beach, 6 June 1944. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives. Online Image: 90KB; 740 x 605 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 80-G-651677 USS Tide (AM-125) Sinking off "Utah" Beach after striking a mine during the Normandy invasion, 7 June 1944. USS PT-509 and USS Pheasant (AM-61) are standing by. Photographed from USS Threat (AM-124). Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives. Online Image: 78KB; 740 x 610 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 26-G-2370 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Coast Guard manned USS LST-21 unloads British Army tanks and trucks onto a "Rhino" barge during the early hours of the invasion, 6 June 1944. Note the nickname "Virgin" on the "Sherman" tank at left. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 94KB; 740 x 615 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 26-G-2517 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Landing ships putting cargo ashore on one of the invasion beaches, at low tide during the first days of the operation, June 1944. Among identifiable ships present are USS LST-532 (in the center of the view); USS LST-262 (3rd LST from right); USS LST-310 (2nd LST from right); USS LST-533 (partially visible at far right); and USS LST-524. Note barrage balloons overhead and Army "half-track" convoy forming up on the beach. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Online Image: 142KB; 740 x 615 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 80-G-252797 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 USS LST-325 (left) and USS LST-388 unloading while stranded at low tide during resupply operations, 12 June 1944. Note: propellers, rudders and other underwater details of these LSTs; 40mm single guns; barrage balloon; "Danforth" style kedge anchor at LST-325's stern. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives. Online Image: 81KB; 740 x 610 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives
Photo #: 80-G-252940 Normandy Invasion, June 1944 Senior U.S. officers watching operations from the bridge of USS Augusta (CA-31), off Normandy, 8 June 1944. They are (from left to right): Rear Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, Commander Western Naval Task Force; Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, U.S. Army, Commanding General, U.S. First Army; Rear Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, (with binoculars) Chief of Staff for RAdm. Kirk; and Major General Hugh Keen, U.S. Army. Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives. Online Image: 96KB; 740 x 530 Reproductions may be available through the National Archives

For higher resolution images see: Obtaining Photographic Reproductions

Adopted from : http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-eur/normandy/normandy.htm

Stories of the Battle of Britain 1940 – Dunkirk, Operation Dynamo

27 May – 3 June 1940

27 May 1940 is today regarded as the beginning of Operation Dynamo – the final evacuation of British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk with the use of hastily assembled fleet of 850 vessels. As we have seen in the previous week’s post, fierce action at sea and in the air started already during the preceding days.

Ironically, Operation Dynamo very nearly ended on that day.

On 26 May the German Army seized Boulogne and Calais. This left Dunkirk as the only remaining harbor in the hands of the BEF, and both sides concentrated their aerial activity on it.

Early in the morning on 27 May the French on the western side of the perimeter were forced back to within five miles of Dunkirk. With the enemy’s guns dominating the town and the normal approach from Dover, British ships were forced to approach the port by a roundabout route from the East until a more central channel could be swept clear of mines. As this eastern route was over twice the length of the direct passage, the number of journeys made by the ships was correspondingly reduced.

Then the Luftwaffe, concentrating its attacks against the town and harbour, wrought such havoc that all British troops were ordered outside the town. The newly arrived Senior Naval Officer, Captain Tennant, had to inform Admiral Ramsay that the Dunkirk harbour would have to be abandoned, and evacuation henceforth conducted solely from the beaches. It was a devastating blow. The importance of keeping the harbor open to shipping may be underlined by the fact that 80% of the evacuated troops were embarked at the quays of Dunkirk harbor directly onto large ships.

On top of all these calamities the Belgians capitulated with only the briefest notice, leaving a twenty-mile gap on the left of the BEF perimeter. Fortunately this had been anticipated, and appropriate movements had been ordered by the commanding officer of the BEF, Lord Gore.

All this contributed to a worrying result of the day – only 7,010 men were evacuated, of almost 200,000 British soldiers remaining on the French soil.

The map showing the shrinking BEF perimeter at Dunkirk
[Crown Copyright, via HMSO publications]

The Fighter Command, with its limited resources found itself quite unable to prevent the destruction of Dunkirk. The initiative throughout lay with the Luftwaffe, which could strike when it was pleased. While the Admiralty and troops on the ground expected continuous cover over Dunkirk throughout the day, Keith Park of No. 11 Group could secure continuity only at the expense of strength. All he could not provide for the Dunkirk evacuation was an aerial cover in strength of a single squadron at a time. Units took off from British airfields at approximately fifty-minute intervals from 4:30 in the morning till 7:30 at night.

Although such cover was not sufficient to prevent the bombers from coming through, it posed significant danger to the Luftwaffe. On one occasion, 12 unescorted Dorniers Do 17 of III/KG 3 were jumped by Spitfires and in quick succession lost half of their number. On other occasions, the British fighters found themselves greatly outnumbered. Eleven Spitfires of No. 74 Squadron, for instance, gave battle to thirty Do 17s and Messerschmitt Bf 190s; five Hurricanes of No. 145 Squadron attacked the rear section of a Do 17 formation only to find themselves set upon by twenty or thirty Bf 110′s; twenty Hurricanes and Spitfires of Nos. 56 and 610 Squadrons, trying to pick off a single He.111, at once ran into thirty or forty Me.110′s.

To everyone’s relief, the following day brought some respite from Luftwaffe attacks, mainly thanks to the worsening weather and the pall of black smoke from the burning oil tanks that hung over the town. Indeed, the greatest danger on 28th May came not from the Luftwaffe, but from the confusion on the beaches, to which evacuation had now been confined. The small craft at work that day were far too few for the tremendous task of ferrying the troops to the ships offshore. A sense of chaos at the beaches lead to wild scrambles to get abroad the small boats which were often swamped in the surf. Worse still, many rescued groups cut their boats adrift after reaching the waiting vessel, instead of arranging for their return to shore.

The Royal Air Force was in no doubt of its responsibilities. Chief of the Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall signalled that day to the chiefs of all RAF commands:

“Today is likely to be the most critical day ever experienced by the British Army. The extreme gravity of the situation should be explained to all units. I am confident that all ranks will appreciate that it is the duty of the R.A.F. to make their greatest effort today to assist their comrades of both the Army and the Navy.
(…)
[Fighter Command shall] ensure the protection of Dunkirk beaches (three miles on either side) from first light until darkness by continuous fighter patrols in strength and have due regard to the protection of bomber sorties and the provision of support of the B.E.F. area.”

Meanwhile, Coastal Command was ordered to maintain a continuous daylight patrol from the North Goodwins to Gravelines and thence along the coast to Ostend. It was asking much for formations of no more than three Blenheims, Hudsons, Skuas and Rocs to fly over waters where the very thick of the enemy’s single-engined fighters would be found, but the duty was faithfully performed until the end of the evacuation.

Lockheed Hudson of RAF Coastal Command approaching the beaches of Dunkirk, with “little ships” in action below
[Crown Copyright, via HMSO publications]

The 321 sorties flown by No. 11 Group in the course of the day allowed a force of up to two squadrons over the evacuation area, but still left short intervals when there was no fighter cover. During the morning the Luftwaffe was up in force, and British fighters intercepted many powerful formations, one of which was estimated to no less than 150 aircraft; then the weather closed in, and the Lufwaffe all but ceased the operations in the afternoon. Six ships were sunk and others damaged during the day, but the Navy was reporting that ‘Fighter protection has been invaluable, and … bombing only sporadic’. The sense of renewed hope was strenghtened towards the evening when it became clear that the Dunkirk harbour could still be used.

By 29th May the greater part of the BEF was inside the organized defences of the perimeter. And ships were again being directed to the port by day.

Keith Park, who had protested strenuously against the policy of continuous but weak air cover, was now authorized by the Air Ministry to operate less often but at greater strength. From this day onwards he accordingly arranged the No. 11 Group patrols so that up to four squadrons — sometimes in two separate formations — were over the Dunkirk area at the same time. The result on 29th May was stronger protection for eleven of the seventeen daylight hours, though during the other six there was no cover except by the small Coastal Command patrols. In the morning, when the enemy’s attacks were light, these intermissions had no serious results; but we were not so fortunate during the afternoon and evening, when the Luftwaffe succeeded with a new and devastating series of attacks against shipping. Despite the temporary confusion when the harbour was again reported blocked and the Admiralty withdrew the most modern destroyers, the balance of the day was considered a success. Admiral Ramsay signalled to Fighter Command:

“‘I am most grateful for your splendid cooperation. It alone has given us a chance of success …”

On 30th May, weather turned again in favour of the British, with solid cloud cover hanging low over the beaches. Sporadic air actvity occurred in the afternoon, without much profit to either of the sides.

At sea, the immortal flotilla of the ‘little boats’ had finally arrived. The embarkation went much smoother than during previous days. The troops had built a pier of lorries at Bray; powered craft were employed in rounding up the boats which had been cut adrift. By the end of the day hopes ran high that the night of 31st May/1st June would see the last of the BEF brought to safety.

That day Hitler recorded:

“The consequence of the blunders forced upon by Supreme War Headquarters (OKW){ is beginning to be felt now.… The pocket would have been closed at the Coast if only the armour had not been held back. As it is, the bad weather has grounded our air force and now we must stand by and watch how countless thousands of the enemy are getting away to England under our noses”

After early morning haze, 31st May cleared into a fine day, prompting new fierce attacks which concentrated on shipping, omitting the town and harbour installations. Despite the immense pressure of the attacks which during the afternoon were conducted with half-hour intervals, their real success was very limited. With hundreds of small vessels at sea, the Germans had a hard time hitting suitable targets to inflict any significant damage.

On 1 June, Stukas appeared once again over the beaches, succeeding in sinking 30 larger and smaller vessels and wreaking havoc among the troops wading in water waiting for their boats. Furious fighting marked the rest of the morning—on one occasion twenty-eight Hurricanes were in combat with fifty or sixty German Bf 109′s and 110′s. During the afternoon, the weather mercifully closed again. But the majority of the troops were now safely in Britain and it was decided that further evacuation would be conducted by night, thereby depriving the Luftwaffe of their bombing targets.

Operation Dynamo ended on 3 June with the fall of Dunkirk. Although losses were considerable, the operation as a whole was a great success. 338,000 men were rescued against the initial assessment of 45,000. Fighter Command losses over Dunkirk during the operation amounted to 113 aircraft, no less than 67 of them being Spitfires.

Burned out British lorries left behind at the French beaches
[Bundesarchiv]

Sources
Dennis Richards, ROYAL AIR FORCE 1939–1945, VOLUME I: THE FIGHT AT ODDS, LONDON 1953 HMSO

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